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Initially, it seemed like African countries were spared the COVID-19 out-
break, but recent infections across the continent have nudged leaders into 
action. The African Centre for Disease Control reports show that more are 
getting infected. If structures are not effectively utilised to halt the spread of 
the virus, it will have drastic implications for the continent. 
 • Following specific guidelines like quarantining, physical distancing, intensive 
hygiene routines, travel restrictions, and shutdown have slowed the speed of 
the spread and reduced the pressure on healthcare systems, as observed in 
other countries.
 • The political, economic, social, and infrastructural challenges in many African 
countries make it difficult and impracticable to implement some of these meas-
ures. For instance, lack of infrastructure like access to water and health facili-
ties are only some of the challenges Africans will have to face. 
 • In addition to applicable global measures, policymakers must consider and uti-
lise structures already in place, and draw on local technologies and expertise. 
Policy Implications
Global measures should be adapted to local conditions in Africa. First,  local 
agents must be used to sensitise people to COVID-19 in communities. More 
 local expertise and technologies will minimise the cost of implementation. Sec-
ond, a public-private partnership is paramount for successful implementation. 
 Leaders must commission capable manufacturers for the emergency production 
of personal-protection equipment. Third, African leaders must incorporate an 
emergency mindset if the political and socio-economic repercussions are to be 
minimised. 
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Preparing for a Potential Crisis
In just four months, the COVID-19 pandemic has spread to almost every continent. 
Initially, African countries seemed to have been spared the outbreak, but recent in-
fections across the continent have nudged leaders into action. In response, African 
countries have instituted measures including the standard quarantining of infected 
or suspected patients, travel restrictions and border closures, physical distancing, 
and curfews. These measures are consistent with those recommended by the World 
Health Organization, the various Centres for Disease Control (CDCs), and those fol-
lowed by many countries dealing with the virus too. 
As of now, a combination of these measures appears to be the most sensible 
way to prevent infection, slow the speed of it, and reduce the pressure on health-
care systems. With Africa’s relatively low infection rates at the moment, the best 
shot countries have at countering the virus’s spread is to prioritise the containment 
and prevention of community infections. However, political, economic, social, and 
infrastructural challenges in many African countries make it difficult and indeed 
impracticable to implement some of the measures like quarantining, intensive care, 
and physical distancing currently being adopted in other continents. 
As a result, African countries need to evaluate the structures in place and adapt 
global measures to local conditions. In addition to such measures, policymakers 
must utilise local structures and draw on local technologies and expertise to con-
trol the spread of the virus. Localisation is not antithetical to the use of measures 
implemented elsewhere. Rather, it means African countries using local measures in 
tandem with adapting external strategies to local conditions where necessary. 
COVID-19 Measures Meet Africa 
Although the idea of “physical distancing” has become a most prominent strategy 
in the current context, the strategy is not new as a means of containing pandemics. 
In the past, public gatherings have been cancelled as a way to contain the spread of 
disease. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the measure applied again to contain 
the spread of COVID-19. As relatively easy to apply as physical distancing, curfews, 
and shutdown may be in European countries however, in the African context imple-
menting such measures is by no means straightforward. Many African governments 
have begun to institute curfews, shutdowns, and travel bans but they still have to 
deal with the difficulty of implementing physical distancing and to handling the 
other factors that come along with it. 
Many African cities, towns, and villages are way more crowded than their Eu-
ropean counterparts when compared in terms of their landmass. The population 
density for Luanda is about 25,000 residents per square kilometre, while Lagos is 
estimated at 6,000 residents per square kilometre. The spread of the virus in such 
cities will have more drastic consequences, and it will be a far greater challenge 
for governments to halt or manage the movement of people in these areas. In most 
towns and rural communities, physical distancing might be tricky when local mar-
kets remain open given that they are essential. This is because these local markets 
are crowded and have open stalls; managing or mitigating the influx of people will 
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be a daunting task. In poor and densely populated cities and towns, this could cause 
the spread of the virus to escalate. 
 In addition to the movement of people, there is the question of the culture of 
communality which has survived all historic periods. Communality is so much at 
the core of African culture that it has managed to remain part of social life even 
after colonisation and into the age of globalisation. Hence, it is not uncommon to 
have not just immediate but also extended family members living together under 
one roof. Therefore, in some cases, villages and communities may not be densely 
populated but the living situations are in bad conditions in poor households. If the 
government manages to control movement, there is still the challenge of ensuring 
that precautions are followed in households of more than ten  people. There are also 
villages and communities with low population densities that are relatively difficult 
to access. For example, Idjwi Island in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Samburu 
County in Kenya, and the village of Odeni-gida in Nasarawa State, Nigeria, are just 
a few of the many remote places of the continent that have little to no information 
on the pandemic. In such places, agricultural production is the main source of in-
come, and every member of the community is in one way or another involved in the 
transportation of commodities. Hence, their remoteness does not inhibit the spread 
of disease. If today’s health challenges are approached in such a way as to cater for 
tomorrow and beyond, then these communities must be sensitised to the pandemic 
and the precautionary measures to be taken. 
Given that many villages in Africa are remote, this also means that in most 
cases basic infrastructure is not available for the masses. For instance, in Odeni-
gida, communities have no electricity, no telecommunication providers, and have 
limited access to clean water. Dealing with the issue of access to water is of the 
utmost importance to prevent the spread of the virus: the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) records that one-third of all African countries suf-
fer from a scarcity of clean water (ECA 2006). These issues pose a challenge to 
access to proper hygiene routines. The Africa CDC is concerned that a spike in the 
number of cases will totally overwhelm respective healthcare systems. For instance, 
Kenya, a country of more than 50 million people, has only 130 intensive care units 
and only 200 intensive care nurses (Nordling 2020); Odeni-gida, only one clinic 
and two beds. Initially, only Senegal and South Africa had equipped facilities to 
test for the virus; without these, the continent was at risk of lacking the means to 
monitor and contain the spread of COVID-19, the outcome would be a situation of 
under-reported or not-reported cases of the virus. To contain the spread, countries 
need to know the number of infected people. If there are not enough facilities, the 
accuracy of confirmed cases and who to quarantine or treat becomes close to impos-
sible. If preventive measures are not taken seriously, Africa might be sitting on a 
powder keg.
At the moment, the most pressing problem that African countries face to effec-
tively kick-start the implementation of measures is sensitisation. Amidst measures 
already put in place by African governments like the closing of borders in Uganda, 
suspension of all international passenger flights to and from Kenya, the shutdown 
in South Africa, and the closing of intrastate borders in Nigeria, misinformation 
could lead to the ineffectiveness of implemented measures. There are two extremes 
to the challenge of misinformation currently affecting responses. On the one hand, 
many African people are going about their daily lives without adhering to precau-
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tions. There are church services, prayers in mosques, weddings, and parties. This is 
because there is an unfounded popular assumption that black people cannot con-
tract COVID-19. Although this notion seemed quite prevalent in African-American 
communities in the United States, it is also the case that it holds strong currency 
in Africa too. Several social media messages are circulating that the virus does not 
affect Africans; others say it is an invention of Europeans to kill Africans. 
Religion also plays a huge role in the nonchalance of people towards taking 
precautions. A good instance is a comment by the Tanzanian president, John Magu-
fuli. In his speech to a church congregation, the president likened the pandemic to 
Satan, needing divine intervention to be quelled. He further stated that church-
es and mosques will remain open because that is where “there is true salvation” 
(Ng’wanakilala 2020). Islam and Christianity have a stronghold in Africa, and heav-
ily influence the way people think. So much so that, in most cases, religious leaders 
have more legitimacy than political ones. Even with the government ban, a Nigerian 
pastor held an evangelical gathering with 30,000 people. This tendency to obey 
religious leaders more explains the indifference towards COVID-19 measures and 
poses a threat to their implementation. On the other hand, misinformation leads 
to stigmatisation and discrimination. If people are not accurately informed, they 
might regard infected individuals as dangers to society. In extreme cases, this could 
lead to physical violence – as seen in the case of Kenya (Fredrick 2020). 
If the COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread as drastically as it has in other 
world regions, it will affect African social life as we know it. Given that social welfare 
is almost non-existent in most African countries, vulnerable groups could be hugely 
affected by the outbreak. It is uncommon in African societies to have retirement 
homes because taking care of the elderly is the responsibility of family members. 
Therefore, in times of physical distancing and intrastate travels bans, catering to 
the elderly may become more difficult. This also applies to the homeless. Usually, 
these groups do not receive any social benefits from the government; they mostly 
rely on alms handed to them on the street or through charity organisations. A shut-
down would mean that some vulnerable groups will be left to fend for themselves.
Political and Economic Implications 
Disasters like the outbreak of disease are political and economic problems, as they 
affect decisions of government in these sectors. Regardless of how the CODVID-19 
outbreak unfolds in Africa, its countries are bound to suffer political and economic 
repercussions. As they direct resources to the COVID-19 response, leaders have cut 
down on routine government business – especially that requiring in-person con-
tact. Some legislatures continue sitting but mainly to consider emergency bills, 
while others like in The Gambia and South Africa have suspended sittings indefi-
nitely. With two South African and a few Nigerian politicians testing positive for 
the virus after meeting with foreign delegates who later tested positive themselves, 
further precautions may lead governments across the continent to operate at re-
duced capacity. 
While some measures can be easily reversed when the outbreak subsides, an 
epidemic can force political choices with more fundamental repercussions. Opposi-
tion parties may not enthusiastically cooperate with authorities out of worry that 
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incumbents may gain political capital from steering the crises; in their bid to con-
trol disasters, incumbents can overstep their authority or usurp emergency  powers 
for their political benefit. In this case, the initial crisis can evolve into a worse dis-
aster. With parliamentary and presidential elections due this year in 22 African 
countries, an epidemic – or even protracted slow infections – will perpetuate a state 
of uncertainly that is bound to disrupt electoral calendars in the form of delays, 
postponements, and cancellations. However, many of the choices made on elections 
will, to an extent, depend on each country’s infection rate and the risk-analysis 
that institutions conduct. For instance, after conducting such analyses, Mali with 15 
infections as of late March went ahead to hold its long-overdue parliamentary elec-
tions, while Ethiopia, which had confirmed 25 cases, postponed elections initially 
scheduled for August. 
One fear is that justifiable containment measures like physical distancing and 
shutdown, which disperse group activities and disempower organisations, may just 
prove to be the right conditions for overzealous government agents to perpetuate 
corruption and commit human rights abuses. For instance, countries like Sierra 
Leone and Togo have declared a state of emergency over COVID-19. Whether Rwan-
da’s total shutdown or Sierra Leone’s 12-month “State of Emergency” are attempts 
at overreach by incumbents to monopolise the political scene or just proportionate 
responses from Ebola-traumatised countries are too early to tell. The verdict will lie 
in how such measures help to protect the population, and how safely leaders steer 
the countries back to normalcy afterwards. 
A protracted pandemic will be even more devastating for African economies. 
Until a few weeks ago, they were among some of the fastest-growing in the world – 
but the outbreak will now push many into recession. Like other disease outbreaks, 
COVID-19 is shaping demand-and-supply forces, fiscal policy, and economic regu-
lation. As with previous global crises, Africa’s small industrial sector makes its 
countries somewhat insulated from industrial shrinkage (ADB 2009). But since 
countries heavily depend on foreign production for essential and non-essential 
imports, COVID-19’s economic impact on the continent depends not just on what 
African leaders do but also on external dynamics. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), uncertainty over the COVID-19 
trajectory in Africa is already stifling foreign investment (UNCTAD 2020), while 
UNECA estimates that falling demand from China will make Africa’s oil-producing 
countries lose about USD 65 billion in revenue. The entire continent may, further, 
lose about 50 per cent of its gross domestic product as commodity prices and de-
mand fall (ECA 2020). If trade partners shift significant domestic manufacturing 
from export into emergency COVID-19 responses internally, Africa will not only 
be denied the critical machinery needed for industrialisation but also become a 
secondary priority regarding COVID-19 supplies – which will become expensive. 
Tourism and remittances, two of Africa’s highest revenue earners, are also taking a 
hit. Though the continent is set to lose only a small percentage of the estimated 50 
million jobs under threat in the global tourism sector (WEF 2020), this still spells 
dire prospects for African employees and their families. 
Sectors that will have their budgets cut or redirected to the virus response will 
miss their growth and impact targets. Africa’s economies are about 60–90 per cent 
informal (ADB 2019) and employ the majority of the continent’s vulnerable – who 
survive solely on the daily profit they make. However, the partial shutdown across 
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the continent is gradually eroding such daily income and will further jeopardise 
even the most ordinary of lives. With such dangers to corporate and consumer eco-
nomic well-being, governments face fiscal deficits and will have to look elsewhere 
for support. While loans and grants may provide temporary relief, they will not 
curtail a recession – circumstances which will only perpetuate the continent’s debt 
problem. 
Implications for Regional Integration
COVID-19 comes at a time when African countries are working to accelerate region-
al economic integration with policies like the common currency in West Africa, the 
Eco, and the Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) set to commence in July. 
As they shift attention and resources to the domestic fight against the virus, leaders 
may delay or even abandon these sub-regional and continental projects. Delay and 
abandonment would be consistent with the observation that African countries tend 
to disengage from regional processes when they have competing domestic priorities, 
or when they feel that integration projects are encroaching on their sovereignty. 
In crisis periods, Africa’s regional organisations are often powerless. This is 
because they are not supranational and therefore can neither coerce member states 
into adopting certain measures nor forcefully ensure compliance with existing pol-
icy. Rather, the African Union (AU) and its sub-regional organisations are relevant 
to the extent that they generate goodwill from and build consensus among member 
states, facilitate resource mobilisation, and lead the creation of new institutions. 
The Africa CDC is providing technical leadership and health expertise in the various 
sub-regions, while the Economic Community of West African States is facilitating 
the creation of a West African laboratory complex and Centres for Disease Surveil-
lance and Control to fight COVID-19 and other disease outbreaks. Additionally, the 
AU Commission has secured a promise from Cuba to help African countries combat 
COVID-19 if need be. 
However these initial responses are limited, not only because the organisations 
depend on the willingness of member states to comply but also because without a 
vaccine or clinically proven treatment COVID-19 is currently contained by partially 
collapsing the structures meant to fight it. For instance, Africa’s regional organi-
sations and their projects thrive on extensive travel and conferences within and 
outside of the continent, but the outbreak has forced institutions like the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, and 
the AU into weeks of physical distancing and remote work. It follows that until a 
proven treatment is found, or African countries record months of zero infections 
and institutionalise the mandatory testing of all foreign arrivals and periodic test-
ing for office staff, the implementation of major projects on African integration like 
the AU’s Agenda 2063, the common African passport, the Eco, and the AfCFTA will, 
at best, be delayed. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that what Africa needs at the national, sub-re-
gional, and continental levels is decisive leadership in the fight against COVID-19 – 
especially as experiences elsewhere show that grim consequences await countries 
that hesitate to act with conviction. The ramification of this is that the implementa-
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tion of development plans will take a back seat as resources shift to the  COVID-19 
response.
Africa must Localise Its Response
Given that African countries currently seem to have relatively low infection rates, 
the most politically, socially, and economically practical strategy is to stay ahead 
of the virus by implementing containment measures. If effectively implemented, 
such measures will stop the virus from spreading further. Policymakers need one 
foundational component herein: an emergency mindset. Some have even argued 
that Africa’s problems are so dire that leaders must approach even “normal” policy 
issues as unprecedented emergencies requiring urgent action (Nyoni 2019). The 
virus has not created new economic and political challenges for Africa; it has merely 
exacerbated long-standing ones. Therefore, emergency responses in these coun-
tries should be considered only the first phase in a much-needed, urgent, long-term 
strategy. Since African countries cannot afford extended periods of shutdown, the 
aim of governments – besides the self-evident purpose of containment – should be 
to restore economic life as quickly as possible.
African countries must localise their response to COVID-19 in a way that ad-
dresses the peculiar political, economic, and social structures. By localisation, we 
mean that, to the extent possible, policymakers must put African leadership, ex-
pertise, and technology at the centre of their response programmes. Localisation is 
not antithetical to global guidelines; learning from the experiences of others is not 
either. However, successful response requires African countries taking charge of 
their fate even as part of global processes. This argument for a localised response is 
based on the observation that as all countries, including the so-called donors and 
development partners are preoccupied with their national responses, no one can 
take on Africa’s burdens. Besides, experts believe COVID-19 may return in the near 
future, suggesting that leaders must think and act beyond the current outbreak. 
Policymakers do not need to invent every measure from scratch. They have already 
adopted some of these, but because Africa’s challenges are so fundamental, the re-
sponses need to be intensified and maintained over the long-term as part of regular 
developmental policy. 
More people should be trained to monitor and test for the virus. This should 
include medical professionals and volunteers. The countries that were affected by 
Ebola appear to be ahead of this. Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone have trained 
community workers to proactively check for symptoms and share health informa-
tion in places where people lack access to the Internet or government services (Pey-
ton 2020). Nigeria has set up and trained rapid response teams in all 36 states of 
the country (Ihekweazu 2020). Such responses need to be replicated in other parts 
of the continent to halt the further spread of the virus. 
Testing and treatment should be accompanied by intensive public education 
through mass-media campaigns. In remote communities lacking access to these 
forms of information, agents should be deployed to keep the masses informed. Tra-
ditional African rulers and religious leaders tend to have high levels of legitimacy 
among the people and should provide leadership in this crisis period. In Ghana, for 
instance, the ruler of the Asante Kingdom has attached a humanitarian supplies 
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programme to the intensive public-education initiatives run by his office. In com-
munities where town-criers are still employed, they can act as agents of communi-
cation as well. They could serve as volunteers to sensitise and to also inform people 
about who to reach out to if they feel they are experiencing symptoms. Vans could 
be turned into makeshift clinics for testing in remote communities. The challenge of 
clean water and running taps in homes have to be addressed. For example, govern-
ments could ensure that tanks deliver clean water to remote areas. 
African countries must also invest in the search for preventive technologies, 
vaccines, and treatment. Senegal’s Pasteur Institute is at an advanced stage of de-
veloping a rapid test kit for the virus, a development which if successful will lead 
to timely diagnosis and early intervention as part of containment measures. Some 
universities in Ghana and Liberia have for the first time released unto the market 
hand sanitisers, a key component of the COVID-19 prevention regime. Not only do 
these measures make expertise available in the current crisis, but they also lay good 
foundations for African countries to integrate home-grown research into long-term 
development strategy. Furthermore, the use of Veronica Bucket in Ghana has pre-
sented an alternative for homes without running taps. Such low-cost technologies 
should be replicated in other African countries. 
Simultaneously, the government must introduce social protection for the vul-
nerable. An emergency food and nutrition programme should be initiated espe-
cially for the disabled, unemployed, rough sleepers, and those recently retrenched 
in cities that have been shut down. As earners of irregular income in the informal 
economy, these people will suffer most from the increasing shutdown of daily eco-
nomic activities. Again, this should be eventually linked to a more formalised social 
protection system. 
For corporate organisations, governments should introduce an economic stim-
ulus package of some sort. A few countries like Botswana, Ghana, and South Af-
rica have already dedicated funds to help cushion economic effects for companies 
in selected sectors. But since many African countries cannot provide a direct cor-
porate financial boost, policymakers must consider commissioning capable local 
manufacturers for the emergency production of personal-protection equipment and 
sanitation products. For instance, a coalition of private companies led by Nigerian 
billionaire Aliko Dangote is currently mobilising to manufacture products and do-
nate funds not just to Nigeria but other African countries to help fight the virus 
(Onu 2020). Within the continent, countries can secure financial support from the 
AU COVID-19 Response Fund, and the USD 3 billion Fight COVID-19 Social Bond 
introduced by the AfDB. They can seek additional support from the USD 50 bil-
lion emergency rapid-funding scheme of the International Monetary Fund, and the 
World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. Ghana, for instance, has 
obtained nearly USD 100 million from the latter to fight COVID-19. Other external 
partners like China, the European Union, and the US can be of help by aligning their 
projects to the localisation agenda. However, countries must acknowledge the im-
plications of accessing these facilities for their subsequent fiscal policy. They could, 
then, cushion themselves by negotiating with donors for debt forgiveness. 
At the sub-regional and continental levels, African countries and their institu-
tions should cooperate to deliver more social, economic, and political normalcy in 
times of crisis. As the AU provides moral leadership and mobilises African experts 
to fight COVID-19 as it did during the Ebola pandemic, the current outbreak is an 
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opportunity for the Africa CDC and its sub-regional offices to negotiate for an ex-
panded mandate that empowers them to enforce compliance with uniform regional 
health standards and procedures. In the medium- to long term, the West African 
countries that will soon launch the Eco must also consider a common fiscal policy 
that will help share the risk and reduce the shocks of the recession that is almost 
certain to hit their economies. As regional and continental bureaucrats continue 
to physically distance themselves, implementation of projects like the AfCFTA, 
common passport, and Agenda 2063 are likely to be delayed. Authorities should 
conduct scenario analyses regarding COVID-19-induced delays and use the results 
to optimise the implementation of countermeasures. Work on the AfCFTA should 
especially be expedited, so that African companies can enter the economies of mem-
ber countries and thereby increase job opportunities for those facing recession. 
Lessons to be Learned 
Usually, the continued relevance of an emergency policy depends on the trajectory 
of the problem that created it in the first place. However, in the case of many African 
countries, the challenges currently faced are so fundamental that even if COVID-19 
ends today, many will still have to contend with the problems of inadequate health 
infrastructure, stunted economic growth, limited social protection for the vulner-
able, a small manufacturing sector, and in some cases the abuse of political and hu-
man rights. What COVID-19 has done is to push African countries to address these 
long-standing issues with a greater sense of urgency. Unlike in some Asian and 
European countries, the virus’s delayed entry into Africa gave policymakers a head 
start on mitigation measures. The more likely story is that with aggressive testing, 
intervention, and the combination of proposals that have been put forward here, 
African countries can avert the catastrophe of community infection and mass fatali-
ties. However with expert predictions that this or other viruses will return in the 
near future, Africa’s safety will depend on the ability of its leaders to maintain an 
emergency mindset over the long term and thus address challenges with urgency. 
Aside from containment, the main job political leaders have is to protect citi-
zen’s rights and steer their countries back to normalcy. Even in fast-paced decision-
making under situations of emergency, governments must demonstrate the will to 
make political decisions that are as consultative and transparent as possible. They 
must act within constitutional powers, and not interfere with the legislature, the 
judiciary, and media. To the extent that their mandates permit, sub-regional or-
ganisations and the AU must conduct scenario analyses for on-time and delayed 
elections and institute the necessary mitigation measures.
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